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Emerging Manager Survey 2024

The next generation of hedge fund managers

STANDING STRONG



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Please note: Percentages in charts may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

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FOREWORD

We are pleased to present the fourth research paper in our series on the small and emerging hedge fund universe. In the first half of this year, AIMA, in collaboration with Marex Prime Services, conducted a brief survey of next-generation hedge fund managers and their investors. Previously, we categorised this group as firms managing up to \$500 million in assets under management (AUM). Recognising that some industry commentators consider this group to be larger, we also surveyed firms managing up to \$1 billion and included that data for relevant comparison.

This report focuses on several key areas: fund fees, average headcount, operational costs (including estimated breakeven costs), and the average time to secure a new investment. The report is divided into two main sections:

Part one will highlight the key findings that we extrapolated as it relates to all the flagship funds of the fund managers who responded to this survey, while part two discusses the key findings of their firms. Where relevant, we offer a time series analysis of how the responses have changed.

We trust that you will find this report useful.

DEMOGRAPHICS

Methodology

This year's report was derived from the findings of two surveys, a hedge fund manager survey which received 171 responses and an investor survey which received 60 responses. The average data points presented in this report are weighted averages derived from using midpoint analysis.

Given over 90% of the respondents to this year's survey are from firms running up to \$500m in assets under management, most of the findings highlighted in this report centre on this population. Where relevant we have provided more granular data for three AUM sub-groups: those managing less than \$100m; those managing between \$101m-\$249m; and those managing between \$250m-\$499m.

Where we have been able to do so, we have included data from the larger manager set (firms who have assets under management between \$500m and \$1 billion), these are identified by the following symbol '*'.

For clarity, we have rounded numbers in charts to whole numbers. In some instances, this has resulted in charts adding to just under or just over 100%.

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MANAGERS

Fig 1 - Average manager AUM, 2024





Fig 2 - Geographical breakdown of manager respondents




171
respondents

\$18.3bn
aggregate AUM
approx

\$107m
average AUM
per manager

INVESTORS

Fig 3 - What best describes you as an investor?




60
respondents

>\$400bn
total assets under
management

17%
proportion that allocate
\$1bn+
to hedge funds

Fig 4 - Where is the head office of your investment plan located?



STRATEGY BREAKDOWN


Managers

While long-short equity and multi strategy still dominate the responses, accounting for 53% of the total number of fund manager respondents, this is down from 61% in 2022. This has allowed for an increase in long-short credit (and slight shifts in various other strategies), while the proportion

of those selecting event driven and Other has remained fairly consistent.

The trend over the long-term has seen the Other category on a downward trajectory, as emerging managers appear to be less motivated to pursue niche strategies.

Fig 5 - What is the primary hedge fund strategy of your firm?



Investors


Investors' strategy preferences align closely with those of managers, with long-short equity emerging as the top choice for 43% of respondents, up from 35% in 2022.

Investors surveyed appear to be shifting away from multi strategy, global macro and event driven funds in favour of fixed income/credit strategies, which have

grown in popularity. In 2022, these strategies accounted for just 4% of investors' allocations, but this figure has increased to 15%.

Over the long-term we have seen the most significant shift in the representation of investors focused on event driven investment strategies.

Fig 6 - What hedge fund strategies were most prominent in your investment allocations? (Multiple choice)



1

FLAGSHIP FUND

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FUND MATURITY

The average maturity of funds in this survey has seen a slight uplift on 2022, but overall below that recorded earlier in this research series.


Fig 7 - When did you launch your flagship fund?



Notably, as per Fig 7 above, only 16% of respondents launched their flagship fund less than a year ago, compared to 25% in 2022. Additionally, one in three flagship funds established more than five years ago now have an AUM of \$100m or less, compared with 50% in 2022 (see Fig 8).

Firms are taking longer to surpass the \$100m AUM threshold amid a more competitive environment for capital raising among emerging funds. We will discuss this further in our capital raising insights on page 37 of this report.

Fig 8 - Maturity of funds launched more than 5 years ago with an AUM of less than \$100m



ALLOCATOR TRACK RECORD REQUIREMENTS

Build your track record! Investors need proof of performance to trust your strategy and have confidence in further success. Without it, securing an investment is tough.

Investors continue to show consistent interest in funds with a track record of one year or less, with 48% selecting this option, in line with previous reports.

As per Fig 9 below, one in five investors prefer a flagship fund track record to be longer than three years, a decrease from the historical range of 4% to 12%.

Further discussions with investors clarified that they are open to allocating to funds with a short track record, but typically only if they have prior experience with these principals at a more established firm.

Fig 9 - How long a track record do you need the flagship fund to have when evaluating it for investment?



FUND DOMICILE

Cayman and US remain the dominant domiciles - two-thirds of funds launched in the past year selected one of these jurisdictions.

Elsewhere, APAC managers acknowledged the various alternative onshore regimes including Hong Kong, Singapore and Australia. Mauritius has also become a jurisdiction of interest given the increasing focus on India.

As per the Fig 10 charts, around 60% of respondents to this year's survey prefer to domicile their flagship fund offshore, mirroring the 2022 findings. Since our initial report on emerging managers in 2017, The Cayman Islands has consistently been a preferred location for small and emerging managers, with over half of the surveyed fund managers choosing it for their flagship fund.

Fig 10 - Where is your flagship fund domiciled?






Fig 11 - Which hedge fund structure do you predominantly allocate to? (Multiple choice)



This pairs well with investor preferences. 68% of which invest in offshore managers, up from 58% in 2022 (see Fig 11 above).

Fig 12 - Investor fund location preferences by AUM



FEES

Despite ongoing scrutiny and downward pressure on fees, manager compensation remains remarkably steady.

Investors recognise that management fees are crucial for covering the operating costs of the manager. It's important to align the management fee with the fund's expenses, particularly given the manager's stage of development. Additionally, it's worth noting that the mentioned fees exclude managed accounts and related arrangements, which can operate on much lower fees.

Management fee

Management fees have reached a natural plateau, with a very minor adjustment of 0.03% in this year's survey.

This is despite the share of managers charging 2% or higher rising from 9% in 2022 to 13% in 2024. This is still much lower compared to the 21% observed in the pre-COVID report of 2018. Simultaneously, managers charging less than 1% has increased from 10% in 2022 to 16% in 2024. The other fee bands have stayed mostly consistent.

Fig 13 - 2024 Management fee





Fig 14 - Management fees over time




\$500m - \$1bn Managers*	
Management fee	
2022	2024
1.46%	1.53%

Management fee by region

When splitting by region, the average management fee charged per hedge fund manager in 2024 varies slightly (see Fig 15). Regionally, firms with funds based in North America have the highest management fee on average (1.45%), whilst the lowest management fees are charged by managers in APAC (1.33%).


Fig 15 - Management fee by region by year



Management fee by strategy

As per Fig 16, where we examine fees charged by hedge fund strategy, event driven funds command the highest management fees. Focus group discussions revealed that this reflects the specialised skill and inherent supply and demand dynamics. In contrast, global macro funds continue to offer the most competitive hedge fund fees for investors.

Fig 16 - Management fee by hedge fund strategy over time



Performance fee

Aligning with the stability observed in management fees, performance fees have also remained steady at approximately 16.36%, despite increasing investor demands.

Fig 17 - 2024 Performance fee





Fig 18 - Average Performance fee over time




\$500m - \$1bn Managers*	
Performance fee	
2022	2024
18.16%	14.66%



Performance fee by region

Regionally, Europe (ex-UK)-based managers earn the highest performance fees while APAC-based managers receive the lowest (see Fig 19).


Fig 19 – Performance fee by region by year



Performance fee by strategy

When comparing performance fees charged per fund strategy, the range is wider than that observed for management fees across all categories. Event-driven funds command the highest performance fees, while global macro funds have the lowest.

Fig 20 – Performance fees by strategy by year



PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES

Fig 21 – What performance incentives does your fund include? (Multiple choice)

Performance Incentives (PIs)	2017	2018	2022	2024
Overall respondents with PIs	80%	94%	87%	88%
High watermark	87%	89%	77%	80%
Hurdle rate	33%	33%	21%	32%
Clawback	9%	9%	3%	4%
None of the above	20%	6%	13%	12%

88%

have performance incentives

80%

work with a high watermark

32%

of funds have a hurdle rate

While the percentage of hedge funds surveyed this year that have performance incentives have not regained their 2018 peak levels, the overall number of hedge fund managers accepting conditions attached to any performance fee that they earn is relatively steady.

As per Fig 21 above, the high watermark continues to be the dominant mechanism used by investors to help ensure fund managers only get compensated on net new increases in the fund's asset value, though this is lower than earlier surveys.

One in three managers now operate with a hurdle rate, up from one in five that did so in 2022 but consistent with the experience reported in our 2017 and 2018 reports.

Performance incentives by AUM

When analysing this data by the AUM of the fund, those with an AUM of less than \$250m are more likely to be operating with a high watermark, at around 80% compared with 71% for managers with \$250m AUM or greater.

Hurdle rates are more likely to be in play for funds that have \$100m or greater in AUM.

Fig 22 - Performance incentives by fund AUM


Performance Incentives	Less than \$100m	\$100m - \$249m	\$250m - \$499m
High watermark	82%	77%	71%
Hurdle rate	27%	47%	41%
Clawback	1%	15%	-
None of the above	11%	12%	18%



ADDITIONAL FUNDS

When looking to what extent managers have added to their stable of funds, we find that two-thirds of respondents have at least one additional fund.

Fig 23 - In addition to your flagship fund, how many additional funds do you have?



None 1 1 - 3 3 - 5 5+

Breakdown of respondents that have additional funds (no.)	Year		
	2018	2022	2024
0	54%	60%	35%
1	11%	15%	31%
1 - 3	20%	20%	23%
3 - 5	9%	5%	6%
5+	6%	Not an answer option	5%
Average	1.1	2.1	0.7

\$500m - \$1bn Managers*		
Additional funds		
2022		2024
3.5		3.0

Additional funds by AUM


As per Fig 24 below, the results of this survey suggest that managers are cost-conscious when expanding beyond their flagship fund offering. Nearly half of all

respondents who manage less than \$100m AUM do not have additional funds, whereas the vast majority of managers that run more than \$100m AUM do.

Average number of additional funds: 0.7, down from 2.1 in 2022

Nearly half of all smaller managers surveyed are not tempted to open additional funds until the flagship fund surpasses \$100m AUM.

Fig 24 – Additional funds by AUM




Additional funds by region

Nearly 80% of all UK-based survey respondents have an additional fund, with over half of these managing between one and three additional funds.

Likewise, among the 61% of APAC-based respondents with an additional fund, one in three manage more than one additional fund.


Fig 25 – Additional funds by region



Additional funds by strategy

Global macro, event-driven and multi strategy managers tend to have the greatest number of funds, typically managing at least two additional funds alongside their flagship offerings.

Fig 26 - Additional funds by hedge fund strategy



2

YOUR FIRM

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EMPLOYEES


Despite pressure for fund managers to remain cost-competitive, average headcount has held firm.

From the manager respondents in this survey, the average headcount is seven, remaining constant with 2022. While the pandemic accelerated outsourcing and efforts to increase efficiency, many managers are now adopting a sustainable, long-term approach to cost-cutting rather than making reactive changes to short-term economic challenges.

Fig 27 - How many employees do you have at your firm?



\$500m - \$1bn Managers*		
Employees		
2022		2024
14		13



Employees by AUM

Managers start their business small, typically operating with around six people on average. As the firm grows, reaching between \$100m - \$249m,

the average team size expands to about 10 people. For firms managing up to \$500m AUM, it increases slightly to 11 people.

Fig 28 - Average employees by firm AUM over time

AUM	2017	2018	2022	2024
Less than \$100m	5	9	5	6
\$101m - \$249m	11	9	11	10
\$250m - \$499m	12	16	12	11

The average data points presented in these charts are weighted averages derived from using midpoint analysis. Please see methodology (page 5).




Employees by region

Comparing the average headcounts globally, Europe (ex-UK)-based managers have the largest number of staff at 10, while North American managers have the lowest average headcount of 6.

It is likely that the latter is impacted by the large percentage of survey respondents that are long-short equity, which typically have a lower headcount than multi strategy and long-short credit managers.

Fig 29 - Average employees by region over time



COSTS

How have fund managers kept their costs in check?

- Both managers and investors have had costs in much sharper focus, beating them down wherever possible.
- Tech and software vendors' productivity gains, combined with a competitive price environment, means that customers are benefitting from keener pricing.
- Although costs to maintain a fund have remained steady, costs for launching a fund have gone up.

Investors focus is not just on fees but also keeping an eye on the costs incurred by the hedge fund and their impact on the total expense ratio (TER). A fund's operating costs are typically higher as a percentage

of their net asset value (NAV) during start-up / early in the fund's life. This is due to the fund's initial organisational costs and many other costs not being wholly variable with the fund's AUM.

Fig 30 - What does your flagship fund cost to run?




Fig 31 - Average operating expense ratio over time




\$500m - \$1bn Managers*	
Operating Expense Ratio	
2022	2024
0.93%	0.77%

Expense ratio by fund maturity

Funds launched within the last one to three years had a TER of 1.1%, while those launched between three to five years ago had a TER of 0.9%.


Fig 32 - Average operating expense ratio by fund maturity over time



Expense ratio by AUM

As per Fig 33 below, fund managers running up to \$100m in AUM have an operating expense ratio of 1.1% of their NAV. By contrast, managers with an AUM of \$250m - \$499m are operating on a lower expense ratio of 0.85%.


Fig 33 - Average operating expense ratio by fund manager AUM over time



Expense ratio by strategy

When filtering by strategy, multi strategy funds have the highest average operating expense ratio while global macro have the lowest at 0.8%.

Fig 34 - Average operating expense ratio by hedge fund strategy over time



BREAKEVEN

Making a profit is the key aim for any business, and a crucial milestone to achieving profitability is reaching your breakeven point. Startups across all sectors, including fund management, must endure a high burn rate on their working capital. Breakeven calculations in this report reflect the costs of running the fund(s), including operational expenses, salaries and other overheads.


Continuing the trend of emerging managers streamlining costs and optimising operations, fig 35 shows the average breakeven cost (i.e. the minimum amount of assets that need to be managed by the hedge fund firm to cover its operating costs) for

surveyed manager firms running up to \$500m AUM is \$65m. This estimate is slightly higher than the \$64m average breakeven number reported in 2022 in the aftermath of the COVID pandemic (as per Fig 35 below).

While business costs have risen due to higher inflation levels and a return to normal travel habits contributing to a more expensive bottom line, some COVID-enforced practices have persisted. This includes the normalisation of virtual meetings and hybrid working arrangements that require less office space. Managers agree these changes have helped keep breakeven figures below their pre-pandemic levels.

Additionally, outsourcing continues to be a very popular strategy for containing operational costs while leveraging specialist expertise and scalability. A large percentage of fund operations is now delegated to external third parties, further contributing to operational and cost efficiency.


Fig 35 - Average cost of fund manager breakeven (AUM)



The average data points presented in these charts are weighted averages derived from using midpoint analysis. Please see methodology (page 5).

Breakeven by AUM

Fig 36 - Average fund manager breakeven (AUM) over time



Some managers suggest they can breakeven at even lower amounts. Many principals invest their own money as start-up capital and are prepared to operate for a considerable time without drawing a salary. They must be prepared to endure lean years at the beginning, irrespective of the fund's performance, as further investment may not materialise for several years after the fund's launch. Managers we spoke to emphasise the need for sufficient working capital to support several years of sub-scale AUM. Sweat equity is very real!

As Figure 36 shows, as a fund manager grows, so too does the assets under management needed by the firm to breakeven. The results of this year's survey reveal that fund managers with an AUM of less than \$100m can operate on an average breakeven of \$52.5m. At the other end of the scale, once managers grow above the \$250m AUM mark, breakeven is over \$100m.

\$500m - \$1bn Managers*

Breakeven


2024

\$131.4m

Breakeven by strategy

As a measure of the average breakeven cost per strategy, the trend seen in 2022 and 2018 continues with long-short credit having the highest breakeven.

Fig 37 - Average breakeven (AUM) by hedge fund strategy




The average data points presented in these charts are weighted averages derived from using midpoint analysis. Please see methodology (page 5).



Breakeven by region

Closer examination of fund manager's average breakeven cost per region reveals managers in Europe (ex-UK) has the most competitive breakeven point globally at \$55m. In contrast, the UK is above the global average at \$80m.

Fig 38 - Average firm breakeven (AUM) by region



AVERAGE ALLOCATION TO HEDGE FUNDS

Smallest fund size allocation


The smallest fund size that investors would consider allocating to on average is \$106m.

This is down nearly a third from the \$151m recorded in 2022. This decline is largely due to the fact that the percentage of respondents willing to invest in

funds sized between \$50m - \$99m has increased from 15% in 2022 to 31% in 2024.

However, similar to 2022, a large proportion of the respondents, 49% in this year's survey, indicated that they would consider funds smaller than \$50m in AUM.

Fig 39 - What is the smallest fund (as a measure of its US\$ AUM) that your investment plan would consider allocating to?



Average allocation size by investor type





Fig 40 - Allocation size by investor type

RAISING CAPITAL

Fig 41 - Average length of time to close on a new investment



Despite generally good performance reported by managers over the past two years, raising capital has been challenging.

During the COVID period, many allocations were top-ups with existing managers as investors erred on the side of caution, placing their capital with managers who had historically delivered a positive and consistent performance.

Our survey findings reveal that the average period to close on a new investment has increased from six months to eight months. A closer examination of the population by AUM size shows that managers of all sizes have experienced longer times to onboard new investments.

Managers we spoke to identified several reasons for this increase:


- 1 The due diligence process has become more laborious and time consuming. It's not unusual for the process to extend beyond a year, and even then, an investment might not be made.
- 2 Greater use of outsourcing by smaller fund managers creates more links in the chain between manager and investor, adding to the time burden when onboarding.
- 3 As managers grow their asset base and seek to attract institutional investor money, the time taken to onboard new investment tends to be longer.

BARRIERS TO ALLOCATING

A recurring theme frequently highlighted in this research series is that investors' primary concern when working with managers is ensuring robust fund operations, alignment of the investment approach with investor agreements and the presence of a solid business plan.

The evergreen question around fees has resurfaced again among investors as per Fig 42 below, with 63% of those surveyed indicating that fees charged to the fund are too excessive, compared to just over 40% in 2022. This highlights that investors remain very fee sensitive. However, as this report shows, emerging hedge funds are making significant efforts to keep costs down.

Fig 42 - Barriers to allocating (Multiple choice)



SOURCING NEW OPPORTUNITIES


Investors go back to basics

Searching for potential investors can be an arduous task, but our research suggests that the solution may be more straightforward than people realise!

When we asked investors about the source of their most recent hedge fund allocation, the vast majority (two-thirds) reported that it came through their personal network. Additionally, one in five stated it was from a capital introduction via a prime broker.

Reinforcing the idea that new investments are not limited to top-ups on previous allocations, only 6% of investors said their most recent hedge fund allocation was in a fund they had previously invested in. This is a significant drop from 15% in 2022, when COVID-19 severely restricted capital-raising opportunities.

Fig 43 - What is the source of your most recent hedge fund allocation (Multiple choice)



ESG CONSIDERATIONS

After several years of growing interest, environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations have become less of a focus for investors. The widespread adoption of ESG principles has slowed due to macro-economic factors, including heightened geopolitical tensions and increasing global regulatory burdens.

This more complex investment landscape is forcing allocators to reconcile their fiduciary duty to investors with the desire to promote positive social and environmental outcomes.


We asked investors to what extent they required managers to adhere to the Sustainable Finance Disclosures Regulation (SFDR) Articles, laid out as follows:

Article 7: Funds that assess the adverse impact investment decisions have on sustainability

Article 8: Funds that promote environmental or social characteristics

Article 9: Funds that have sustainable investment as their objective

Fig 44 – How do ESG considerations bear on your decision to invest in a fund? (Multiple choice)




ESG by investor types

As per Fig 45, 77% of investor respondents said ESG is not a consideration at all for their allocations. When broken down by investor type, at least 80% of family

offices and private pension plans are not considering ESG at all for their allocations.

Fig 45 – How do ESG considerations influence your investment plan's decision to invest in a fund (by investor)?




ESG by region

From a global perspective, sizeable differences in opinion regarding ESG considerations in allocations emerge between Europe-based investors and those elsewhere.

APAC-based investors are the least likely to consider ESG, with 87% not factoring it into their decisions.

On the other hand, almost half of Europe-based investors include ESG in their allocation decisions. Larger investment plans underscore their expectation for firms to operate on a more sustainable footing whenever possible.

Fig 46 – How do ESG considerations influence your investment plan's decision to invest in a fund (by region)?



LIQUIDITY TERMS

Terms defined:

Hard lock

A restriction imposed on investors that prevents them from redeeming their investments for a specified period, typically without exceptions.

Soft lock with penalty

A liquidity restriction where investors can request redemptions, but doing so incurs a penalty or fee. The penalty may vary depending on the timing or conditions specified.

Investor level gate

A mechanism applied to individual investors within a fund, limiting their ability to redeem based on specified criteria.

Fund level gate

A restriction placed on the entire fund, typically triggered by liquidity concerns or excessive redemptions, temporarily suspending all or part of the fund's redemption requests.

Quarterly

Refers to a redemption frequency where investors can typically redeem their investments once every quarter.

As per Fig 47 (below), nearly half of all investors surveyed this year indicated that funds with hard locks greater than one or two years are the least investable, followed by those with investor level gates.

Clearly, short hard locks are a top priority for investors when considering liquidity terms. Just 3% of respondents said funds with hard locks longer than a month are non-investable, and this figure rises to 5% for hard locks exceeding six months.

This sentiment aligns with the views of fund manager respondents regarding liquidity terms least preferred by investors. Over half of investors indicated that hard locks are least preferred, while one in five managers noted that quarterly liquidity is least favoured (See Fig 48 below).

This demonstrates a clear alignment between fund managers and investors in their preferences for liquidity terms.

Fig 47 - Which liquidity terms make a hedge fund non-investable? (Multiple choice)





Fig 48 - Which liquidity terms are typically least preferred by investors when considering investing in your fund? (Multiple choice)



CONCLUSION

The findings from this year's research clearly demonstrate the ongoing resilience and adaptability demonstrated by smaller and emerging hedge fund firms. This group continues to stand strong amid the fiercest of fee environments as well as increasing costs – all of which are impacting the bottom line of firms across the industry.

Not only are these hedge funds having to stand out from the crowd to attract and maintain investor interest but are keeping a keen eye on costs as well. The latter being an increasingly important factor that smaller firms must consider with any new capital investment taking longer to materialise than in recent years.

We would like to thank all the respondents to this survey. We hope you have found the report useful and informative.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to members of the AIMA Next Generation of Managers¹ for providing their input to the development of this survey and participating in various roundtable discussions throughout this project. We would also like to extend our thanks to the group of investors who contributed to this survey and provided valuable insight regarding their views and expectations as to what is best required from small and emerging hedge fund managers to secure investment.

¹ AIMA's Next Generation of Managers' Group provides a platform for the exchange of ideas and development of a peer networking group, for senior individuals at firms managing less than \$500m in assets under management. The group meets on a regular basis to discuss issues of common concern including capital raising, operational matters and managing the business. Membership is open to all, including AIMA members and non-AIMA members, in the case of the latter for a minimum period of time.

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The Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) is the global representative of the alternative investment industry, with around 2,100 corporate members in over 60 countries. AIMA's fund manager members collectively manage more than US\$3 trillion in hedge fund and private credit assets.

AIMA draws upon the expertise and diversity of its membership to provide leadership in industry initiatives such as advocacy, policy and regulatory engagement, educational programmes and sound practice guides. AIMA works to raise media and public awareness of the value of the industry.

AIMA set up the Alternative Credit Council (ACC) to help firms focused in the private credit and direct lending space. The ACC currently represents over 250 members that manage over US\$1 trillion of private credit assets globally.

AIMA is committed to developing skills and education standards and is a co-founder of the Chartered Alternative Investment Analyst designation (CAIA) – the first and only specialised educational standard for alternative investment specialists. AIMA is governed by its Council (Board of Directors).

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